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‘A foolish dream of sisterhood’: Anti-Pacifist Debates in the German Women’s 
Movement 1914-1919 
Ingrid Sharp1 
 
In 1914, before the outbreak of the First World War, the dominant discourse within the 
women‟s organizations was of the natural pacifism and the international solidarity of all 
women, especially among those who were working to improve their social, professional, 
and political situation.
1
 The women‟s movement since the turn of the century had become 
increasingly international and even the German women, at first reluctant to cooperate 
beyond their own borders, had been drawn in.
2
 International congresses were held in Berlin 
in 1896, 1904 – at which the International Women‟s Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) was 
founded –, and 1912, with a further meeting planned there for 1915.3 
Yet in all combatant nations, the majority of organized women supported the war policies 
of their government and suspended their international contacts for the duration of the war: 
only a very small minority of women in each nation opposed the war and retained or 
strengthened their international contacts. This was certainly the case in Germany, where 
the women‟s coordinated war effort, the Nationaler Frauendienst (National Women‟s 
Service, NFD) was controlled by the nationally-minded umbrella group of bourgeois 
women‟s organizations, the Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (Federation of German 
Women‟s Associations, BDF) led by Gertrud Bäumer. In Germany, as elsewhere, the 
women most likely to maintain international links and to work for peace during the war 
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were also the most enthusiastic suffrage campaigners such as Lida Gustava Heymann and 
Anita Augspurg of the Deutscher Frauenstimmrechtsbund (German Women‟s Suffrage 
Federation), who played an active role in the IWSA, and Helene Stöcker and Lili Jannasch 
of the pacifist organization Bund Neues Vaterland (New Fatherland League), formed in 
November 1914.
4
 
Pacifist campaigners saw working for peace and the prevention of future wars and female 
suffrage as inextricably linked: without the influence of women in government the 
strongest moral impulse for peace would be lacking. On the other hand, political rights 
meant little if war was to be allowed to destroy any progress towards a fairer, more just and 
representative society. When it became clear that the meeting of the IWSA planned for 
Berlin in 1915 could not take place, an alternative congress was planned jointly by women 
from England, Holland, Belgium, Hungary, and Germany. In April 1915, nine months after 
the start of the First World War, over 1,000 women from combatant and noncombatant 
nations met at The Hague to discuss ways of mediating between the warring nations, 
stopping the war and finding ways of resolving future conflict without recourse to 
violence. At the Congress, the transnational organization the International Committee of 
Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP), later renamed the Women‟s International League 
for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) was formed. The Congress brought the underlying 
divisions within the women‟s movement into sharp focus in many nations, dividing 
opinion in England and France as well as in Austria and Germany and creating a rift that 
continued well after the end of the hostilities. Nowhere was this more acute than in 
Germany, where the debate between the BDF and the congress organizers was played out 
in the public arena. 
The Hague Congress has been widely discussed in feminist scholarship,
5
 and most women‟s 
historians have agreed with Leila Rupp‟s 1997 claim that „the Congress of women, bravely 
convened in The Hague during the first year of the Great War, is probably the most celebrated 
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(and was at the time also the most reviled) expression of women‟s internationalism‟.6 Most 
have also concurred with Jennifer Davy‟s 2002 assessment that the peace campaigners of the 
First World War provide a historic point of identification and a political legacy that is far 
more palatable than the patriotic war work undertaken by the majority of organized women.
7
 
With the exception of Annika Wilmers, who offers a more even-handed account, most 
commentators writing about Germany have presented the controversy as the attempt by the 
powerful leadership of the BDF to crush dissent within its ranks
8
 and to „denigrate the 
difficult attempt of courageous women to find a way of bringing the great slaughter to an end, 
by presenting them as a group without a mandate and lacking any expert knowledge‟.9 For 
Sabine Hering, the BDF‟s cooperation with government policies during the war placed them 
on the side of might as opposed to right: „[t]he battle lines are clear. Socialist and pacifist 
women are on the other side. The BDF however is on the side of power and tries to couch 
even its criticism according to the rules of the powerful.‟10 Yet hostility to Bäumer and 
condemnation of her stance often fail to take account of the fact that her position was shared 
by the majority of organized women in combatant and non-combatant nations – for example 
women within the Conseil national des femmes françaises (National Council of French 
Women, CNFF) were even more publicly outspoken in their criticism and even more ruthless 
in their expulsion of pacifist elements from their ranks.
11
  
As well as ignoring the international context, much of the criticism also fails to take account 
of the national context in which the women were operating, for example the particular 
pressure on the BDF caused by the fact that there were four German women among the 
Congress‟s organizing committee, making the need for distancing strategies especially 
acute.
12
 Scholarship tends, too, to place the blame for a lack of sisterly solidarity entirely with 
the BDF, overlooking the highly limited sympathies and lasting resentment displayed by 
women from the pacifist camp to those who did not share their convictions. Davy states that 
„[t]he BDF publicly opposed the participation of German women in the Hague Congress and 
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condemned their pacifist activities‟,13 but it is equally true that the pacifist women condemned 
the BDF for their response to the war: in 1920 Heymann described them as „chauvinistic 
women, steeped in the spirit of militarism, whose sense of true womanliness had been clouded 
by the war psychosis‟.14 
 
By examining the strategies and arguments employed by both groups of women to distance 
themselves from one another and to claim the exclusive right to represent German women, 
this chapter seeks to challenge the one-sided way the controversy has been received. Drawing 
on a wide range of contemporary German press responses to the Hague Congress and to the 
aims of the women‟s organizations before, during and immediately after the war, I will seek 
to show that the context in which the German women were operating was one of long-
standing negative attitudes to feminist goals.
15
  I will argue that this climate of suspicion and 
disapproval reflected in and fostered by the mainstream press was a major factor in forcing 
the BDF into publicly adopting an anti-pacifist position over the Hague Congress, thus 
creating a dichotomy that had far-reaching and highly damaging consequences for the 
women‟s movement in the Weimar Republic.  
 
Different Responses to the War  
 
The fundamental paradox facing the organized women‟s movements in wartime was how they 
could justify activities that would release more men to fight and be injured or killed. The BDF 
justified their war service by stressing the inevitability of war and its nature as a great test 
from which the nation would emerge stronger, as well as the redemptive nature of the deaths 
and the sense of service to a higher ideal that overrode individual concerns. From the outset, 
the women of the BDF laid claim to a parallel war experience in which women played a 
pivotal role. First, this was through their role as mothers and wives of the fighting men: „We 
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mustn‟t ever forget that it is not just military training that is being put to the test out there in 
the trenches and at sea, at the gun emplacements and in the air, but also German mothers‟ 
upbringing and German wives‟ care.‟16 Secondly, this was through a coordinated war effort 
captured in the expression „seelische Mobilmachung‟ („mobilization of the soul‟).17 Through 
the NFD, women schooled in the women‟s movement were able to apply their motherly care 
to the needs of the nation in the familiar fields of social welfare, employment, and 
education.
18
 The BDF believed they were laying down foundations for peacetime acceptance 
of women‟s competence, and it is clear that they set great store by the closeness to 
government and decision-making at state level that they achieved. As Alice Salomon put it: „if 
these had not been times of war, the limitless power given to women would have fulfilled our 
wildest ambitions.‟19 Despite this, the findings of my press survey show that there was little 
public sympathy for the women‟s movement during the war, and despite the women‟s 
integration into government policy, there is no evidence that this was seen as anything but a 
temporary arrangement with no expectation that it would be carried over into the post-war 
social order.
20
 For example, the Kaiser‟s Easter Message of April 1917, in which he promised 
to repay the loyalty and courage of working class men with political concessions that would 
express the new bond of trust between the social classes, made no mention at all of the 
contribution made by women.
21
  
The pacifists, however, did not accept the necessity or inevitability of this or any war, seeing 
it instead as a man-made disaster, a further instance of the failure of male government and 
demonstration of the necessity of women‟s involvement in the state. For Heymann and 
Augspurg: „The world war has proved that the male state, founded and built up on force, has 
failed all along the line; we have never seen clearer proof of its unfitness. The male principle 
is divisive and, if allowed to continue unchecked, will bring about the total destruction of 
humanity.‟22 In this context, deaths could not be meaningful or redemptive, they were merely 
pointless and all the more pitiable because they were unnecessary and avoidable. Pacifists 
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dwelt on the horror of war deaths in order to undermine the elevated language of redemptive 
sacrifice used by the women of the BDF and other supporters of the war. 
 
In contrast to Bäumer‟s almost mystical connection with the German nation,23 the pacifists 
felt strongly that internationalism in this context overrode the national interest: as war – a 
global phenomenon with national and local consequences – destroyed all that women‟s 
work had built in the local community, women must work together across national borders 
to oppose it. This remained the central pillar of their conviction, and the motivation for the 
Hague Congress and the activities of the ICWPP and WILPF. 
Despite the BDF‟s increasingly direct involvement in the war, Bäumer was convinced that 
theirs remained a specifically womanly contribution motivated by love and saw no 
contradiction between women‟s nurturing role and the organization‟s success in fuelling the 
war machinery with workers and soldiers. For Bäumer, as for so many others, August 1914 
was a shared emotional experience of great power and intensity which, she remained sure, 
revealed the underlying connectedness of German society. In 1915 she claimed that „[t]here is 
not one of us who doesn‟t feel that this time, whatever it may bring, whatever it demands of 
us, is for our generation the pinnacle of our existence‟.24  
According to their own account, Heymann and Augspurg felt nothing of this elevated mood, 
feeling themselves clear-eyed yet isolated amidst all the fellow-feeling: „[t]he great crime, 
war, achieved in 24 hours a unity that had eluded the efforts of rational people for decades. 
This behaviour appeared repulsive to us, not glorious.‟25 A tiny minority within the women‟s 
movement, these women saw themselves as the voice of reason amidst a howling storm of 
insanity. While they saw their duty very clearly as trying to stop the war, they were realistic 
enough to realize that few would be willing to hear a dissenting voice in the early moments of 
„war psychosis‟: „The German people felt like a mighty Colossus, united in its purpose of 
defying the whole world. […] Anyone who had dared to openly oppose this unity would have 
been trampled, crushed, lynched.‟26 
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Both groups used a discourse of motherhood to support their position; for Bäumer, it was 
precisely as a mother that a woman could „understand from the innermost depths of her heart 
that a generation has been granted the task of winning with their blood a richer and more 
worthwhile life for those who are to come‟,27 while for Heymann and Augspurg, women„s 
role as bearers of life made their implication in any aspect of war work that led to men‟s 
deaths deeply unnatural and abhorrent: „Women are, just because they are women, against all 
forms of brutal force that seek to pointlessly destroy what has grown, what has become. They 
want to build up, to protect, to create anew.‟28 Even the fact that a majority of women worked 
for and supported the war did not shake this conviction: writing in 1919, Heymann refers to 
the BDF‟s pro-war stance as „the aberration of a few women‟ set against „millions and 
millions who turn away from these women in disgust and were, are, and remain opponents of 
this war out of the deepest conviction‟. 29  While the women‟s responses to the war and 
emotional connection with the nation were radically opposed, it is clear that there were 
sufficient similarities in the roots of their arguments to make the association highly 
problematic: both groups used maternalist discourse, and both claimed that their actions were 
motivated by a woman‟s natural predisposition to love. 
  
Context: Press Coverage of Women’s Role in Wartime 
  
Although press reporting is by no means a fully reliable indicator of public opinion, it both 
reflects and forms it, and a consideration of the discourse in the media will give an indication 
of public attitudes.
30
 This study therefore will use an analysis of German press coverage of the 
three key, interlinked ideas associated with the Hague Congress; suffrage, internationalism, 
and pacifism in relation to the activities of the women‟s organizations between 1914 and 1919 
to offer an insight into the public discourse surrounding feminist goals.
31
 I will argue that in 
this context, in order to remain true to her vision of national service and to protect the long-
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standing goals towards which she was working, Gertrud Bäumer was compelled to distance 
herself and the organization she led from the wartime activities of German pacifist women.  
There were considerable restrictions placed on publication during this period: in effect, the 
German press and publishing policy was in the hands of the military, who determined whether 
a particular publication was harmful to the German war effort.
32
 These measures especially 
affected the pacifist women‟s writings, which could hardly be published or disseminated at all 
within Germany between 1914 and 1918, while the few pamphlets and publications 
expressing pacifist views that were produced in neutral countries such as Switzerland had a 
very limited circulation. In order to gain a better overview of their response, I will therefore 
consider publications from outside Germany, such as the IWSA‟s journal, Jus Suffragii, and 
post-war publications, in which the pacifist women were keen to give a delayed account of 
their anti-war activities.  
Pre-war coverage of suffrage had been complicated by widespread reporting of suffragettes‟ 
violent actions in the UK, such as the slashing of Velasquez‟s Rokeby Venus by Mary 
Richardson on 10 March 1914. The destruction of the beautiful Venus by the „ugly‟ feminist 
was presented as highlighting the contrast between „deviant‟ suffragettes and „normal‟ 
women. The suffragettes‟ tactics were reported as a seven year war against men, a „Reign of 
Terror‟33 that led to questions about the masculinity of English men and the vitality of the 
English race: „in powerlessly knuckling under they are showing a slackness that points to 
degeneration, a lowering of national willpower.‟34  
This coverage also reflected and influenced attitudes to feminist aims and activities in 
Germany, as can be seen for example in the Berliner Volkszeitung on 11 March 1914, in 
which a report on English extremism was used to criticize what were seen as similar 
tendencies in German society: „our entire public life is suffering from a sinister and generally 
damaging feminism.‟35 Writing in Die Hilfe on 10 June, Gertrud Bäumer complained that 
„even liberal newspapers‟ were conflating the suffrage movement with the activities of one 
9 
 
extreme group and using this negative association to condemn the entire campaign for 
women‟s rights.36  However, there are also examples where the negative coverage of English 
feminists had a positive effect on German women‟s feminist campaigns, as they were 
presented as moderate and unpolitical compared to the crazed English deviants.
37
 Fears of 
suffragette extremism spreading to Germany could also be used to advance the German 
women‟s cause: for example Bertha von Kröcher-Winzelberg, president of the Association of 
Conservative Women, argued that Conservative parties should allow women more influence 
within their ranks in order to counter the appeal of the left, who were wooing women with 
„false promises of political equality and the vote‟.38 
Even before the outbreak of war, democracy itself was presented as a weak, unmanly form of 
government and many objected to female suffrage on the grounds that it would so 
compromise the nation‟s strength that it would not be able to defend itself against aggressors. 
Throughout the war, women‟s suffrage continued to be associated with the imposition of an 
alien, un-German form of government upon a nation proud of its military prowess. The 
English suffragettes were sometimes invoked to reflect badly on the enemy‟s military resolve: 
from September 1914 there were widespread reports of a suffragette battalion arming itself to 
defend England, supposedly because Lord Kitchener was unable to find English men to fight: 
„[i]n the English war ministry they are firmly convinced that German soldiers will be just as 
incapable of dealing with mad women as the gentlemen of the island realm.‟39 
With the front soldier elevated in press coverage to the level of mythic hero, any assertion 
of women‟s rights or suggestion that women were seeking recognition for their wartime 
service was seen as distasteful and inappropriate. In the light of men‟s bravery and 
suffering, women could not credibly press their own demands: in 1917 the Deutsche 
Tagesblatt reminded readers that „when the hour of danger for the nation strikes, 
everyone, men and women, do their bit and anyone crying out for a reward is not thinking 
like a German‟. 40  In fact, the BDF believed that through organizational efficiency, 
10 
 
national-mindedness, and a rhetoric of service, women would demonstrate their value to 
society and fitness for civic and political rights, but these aims could not be openly 
articulated without negative response. Even as late as 1917, when constitutional reform 
was being openly discussed and the BDF had sent a position paper in favour of female 
suffrage to the Reichstag, female suffrage was presented in the press as a selfish, deeply 
unpatriotic demand, inappropriate during war time.
41
 
The need for caution was exacerbated by the sensitivity surrounding women‟s moral 
behaviour, which took on national significance during the early war years. Press reports 
show that women and girls‟ education and behaviour, competence as mothers and 
housewives and their consumption habits (notably of unpatriotic luxuries like cake and 
international fashion items) were under close scrutiny throughout the war.
42
 As early as 
August 1914, the hysterical response to thinly-evidenced reports that some German 
women and girls had been approaching French prisoners of war and offering them food 
and comforts is a case in point: scores of articles appeared with variations on the title 
„würdelose Weiber‟ („shameless hussies‟) and the responses outdid themselves to 
condemn these girls and suggest increasingly harsh punishments for their transgression: 
For the Berliner Tageblatt their behaviour was „nothing short of treason‟;43 while the 
Berliner Volksblatt suggested a spell in the stocks for these „Ungeziefer‟ („pests‟) on the 
symbolic national oak.
44
 Freifrau von Klöcker wrote that „only harlots could do such a 
thing and harlots are international [...] we would like to publicly denounce 
[„brandmarken‟, literally „brand‟] those who through behaviour devoid of breeding and 
morality dare to cast doubt on our honour as German women!‟.45  It is likely that there 
was a strong class element to this aristocratic lady‟s condemnation of these women, but 
the opprobrium was in no way restricted to the lower classes. Although by 2 September 
1914 the initial reports were seen to be greatly exaggerated, responses continued: on 10 
September, the Deutsche Tageszeitung printed letters from serving soldiers under the 
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heading „Pfui Deibel!‟ („For Shame!‟) including one that urged: „pass the horsewhip and 
then harder, harder.‟46 
Unsurprisingly, „German‟ came to signify entirely positive attributes, while 
„international‟ was purely negative. War was seen as a teacher, and its lesson for women 
was that they must learn „to feel and think in a German way again [...] drive everything 
foreign from your hearts [...] let the spirit of purity and nobility in once more, hold on to 
German simplicity, breeding, and morality‟.47 The Berliner Lokalzeitung spells out the 
task for women: „be national, think German, feel German, act German in everything, be 
aware of your Germanness in the smallest as in the biggest things.‟ 48  This recurs 
throughout the war – in 1917 there is a veiled threat in the Hamburger Korrespondenz 
about what might happen „when the men come back from bloody battles and deprivations 
and ask the first question in judgement: what were you doing while we bled, froze, 
huddled in dugouts, fought and – were victorious?‟.49 
Coverage of the Hague Congress, with its emphasis on international cooperation, was 
overwhelmingly negative: one response was mockery of the delegates, first as childless 
spinsters using the discourse of motherhood to claim their mission for peace; secondly as 
women trespassing on the domain of men, and thirdly as a sex deemed incapable of 
rational discussion attempting formal debate. The inability of 181 English women to 
secure papers or passage to attend the congress was also widely reported as hilarious.
50
 
Another response was outrage at the women‟s lack of national feeling and especially at 
their analysis of the war as „mass psychosis‟. This was seen as a particular betrayal of the 
soldiers, especially as it came from the very women they were defending with their lives. 
In response to an anti-war pamphlet by Frida Perlen, the Hamburger Nachrichten claims 
that while soldiers are in the field fighting for German women, „at home behind their 
backs a suffrage lady under the flag of peace is inciting the most abominable war of all, 
the war of the sexes‟.51 The Vossische Zeitung, although not as hostile as many papers, 
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nonetheless expressed the suspicion that the women were more interested in securing 
political advantages for themselves than in world peace.
52
 
It is notable that neither the BDF nor the majority of the press felt obliged to engage with 
the content of the women‟s resolutions. Merely the fact of German women discussing the 
war with the women of enemy nations was enough to fuel the outrage.  
 
The Hague Congress as Catalyst  
 
From the outset the plans for the Congress resulted in greater public activity by the 
pacifists and greater public notice of their ideas by the press.
53
 The BDF was keen to 
downplay the significance of the Congress for the women‟s movement and did not wish 
to enter into a debate that attracted further attention to it, but this was difficult to sustain 
as German women were playing a well-publicized role in its organization. The call for 
Congress participation in February 1915, which was widely distributed and reproduced in 
the German press, set out the pacifist women‟s principles clearly, condemning the war as 
a product of male politics and openly demanding women‟s suffrage as the only way of 
preventing future wars:
54
 „We women declare the war, the last word in men‟s 
statesmanship, to be madness. War is only possible in the life of nations in the grip of a 
mass psychosis, for it seeks to destroy everything that the creative forces of humanity 
have built up over centuries.‟55 
The Hague women‟s commitment to peace was not passive at all, nor was it domestic: 
instead it was confrontational, attacking the war, attacking men and their fitness to 
govern, and even attacking the nation state. Moreover, these women claimed the 
authority to speak for all women, undermining the BDF‟s careful public position of 
disinterested patriotic service to the Volksgemeinschaft and associating it with the highly 
negative concepts of suffrage, internationalism, and pacifism discussed above. The BDF 
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therefore felt compelled to distance itself from the pacifist women and vigorously assert 
their counter-claim that they were the sole authoritative voice of the organized women‟s 
movement in Germany. In fairness to the BDF, there was some justice to this claim. For 
one thing, the BDF was numerically far the biggest women‟s organization in Germany,56 
but more importantly its leadership of the NFD meant that at that time it could truly claim 
to be representative of the German women‟s movement. Working closely with the Red 
Cross, the NFD coordinated all women‟s activities, whether voluntary work, charity 
work, or paid employment and included socialist women‟s organizations in its ranks: the 
early months of the war saw a wave of 40,000 middle class volunteers but also of 1,400 
working class women.
57
 In contrast, the pacifist women failed to find support even from 
within the ranks of the German suffrage organizations and international as well as 
national women‟s organizations overwhelmingly rejected the idea of the Congress. 
The BDF‟s own press release appeared in the national press in April 1915, and stressed 
that the Congress was neither organized nor endorsed by the women‟s movement and that 
it was „absolutely out of the question for any serious women‟s organization to participate 
in this Congress‟.58 Bäumer was at pains to make clear that individual women attending 
did so without any representative function and that the German women‟s movement had 
„no wishes other than those of our whole nation‟,59 and therefore would not be associated 
with the „special requests‟ (that is suffrage) demanded at the Congress. The BDF 
expressed its strongest objection to the analysis of the war as madness and mass 
psychosis, seeing in this a denigration of the soldiers‟ fighting spirit: 
„Should German women deny the moral strength that is calling their husbands and 
sons to their deaths by declaring the courage and self-sacrifice of our menfolk to be 
„madness‟ and „psychosis‟? Should we, whom they are defending, spiritually stab our 
men in the back by despising and denigrating the inner values that they are fighting 
to uphold?‟60 
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In her Heimatchronik of 28 April 1915, Bäumer makes clear that for her this moral duty 
applied to women in all the warring nations and that international discussions about the war 
were only morally possible for women of neutral countries.
61
 In her letter of refusal to 
Congress organizer Aletta Jacobs of 4 April, Bäumer repeatedly asserted her claim to speak 
for German women by using the formulation „die deutschen Frauen‟: „German women‟ could 
not attend a congress at the present time, „German women‟, even those who supported the 
peace movement, were not in agreement with the Congress‟ resolutions: „it is obvious to us 
that during a national struggle for existence we women belong to our nation and only to our 
nation.‟62 
Behind the scenes, too, the struggle to assert the rival claims was being fought, each side 
accusing the other of being the first to go public.
63
 In a letter to the BDF leadership of 29 
March 1915, the organizing committee of the Congress decisively rejected „the example of 
the BDF leadership: to offer up the public spectacle of women squabbling at this time‟. The 
committee also objected strongly to the BDF leadership‟s claim to speak for all women in the 
combatant nations and their attempt to impose their „narrow-minded‟ and „one-sided‟ vision 
on other women: „they should however not judge others by their own lack of knowledge and 
understanding of broader affairs.‟64 During this time, an internal BDF memo was circulated, 
stating that attendance at or support for the congress was „incompatible with the patriotic 
sentiments and national duties of the German Women‟s Movement‟ and „with any position or 
area of responsibility within the BDF‟,65 effectively forcing members such as Alice Salomon 
to choose between their international connections and BDF office. To Bäumer‟s irritation, this 
directive was leaked to the press and widely interpreted as a boycott of the peace conference 
and a slur on the patriotism of the organizers. Bäumer was in the difficult position of 
appearing to be against peace and found herself under fire from her fellow liberals, notably 
the pacifist Ludwig Quidde.
66
 In a letter sent on 16 May 1915, he accused Bäumer of high-
handedly restricting BDF members‟ freedom of conscience. Referring to their shared pre-war 
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condemnation of ad personam political tactics, he went on: „and now out of our own ranks 
and even worse, out of the women‟s movement, comes an attack against comrades and 
countrywomen that adopts these methods, just because these women have different views 
from the majority about their patriotic duty and what their patriotism demands of them.‟67 For 
Quidde, „the worst male organization could not have acted worse!‟.68  
Throughout the war, Bäumer continued to stress that the women‟s movement had not 
been represented at the congress. In a letter to the Silesian branch of the BDF, whose 
leader, Marie Wegner, was critical of the leadership‟s response, she referred to „a 
congress of haphazardly thrown together individuals‟ with no authority or competence to 
debate questions of international politics.
69
 Bäumer‟s article in Die Frauenfrage of 
September 1915 offered the most thorough and critical account, in which Bäumer 
attempted to clarify that it was not the pacifists‟ desire to fight for peace that was 
„incompatible with national feeling‟ but the form this took and the aims and timing of the 
Congress. In this article, she adopted a position similar to that of the IWSA, that the war 
had interrupted „but not destroyed‟ international connections within the women‟s 
movement and that „German women have no intention of seeking to disavow this 
common ground‟, but that the Congress itself was ill-advised.70 In support of her stance, 
Bäumer cited the views of a Dutch woman, Fräulein Dr von Dorp, who had attended the 
congress and concluded that „these women have not the slightest concept of their own 
superficiality‟.71  
In the BDF‟s view, the pacifist women were lost in the realm of abstraction, their analysis 
naive and their responses sentimental and superficial. Even honest hatred of the enemy was 
preferable to the (to them) inauthentic expressions of sisterly love that characterized the 
pacifist discourse: „Love and hatred belong together. […] The more we are capable of 
becoming one with our nation, the more we feel its enmities as our own. [...] It would be 
senseless, even cruel and inhuman, if we German women could […] stand before Germany‟s 
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enemies with the lacklustre objectivity of the neutrals.‟72 Bäumer used words such as „blass‟ 
(„pallid‟), „blutarm‟ („anaemic‟), or even „blutleer‟ („bloodless‟)73 to stress the abstraction and 
intellectualism of the pacifists‟ response in contrast to full-blooded emotions felt directly and 
passionately. Writing in Die Frauenfrage, Bäumer states: „We cannot make ourselves 
“international”! We cannot – we women least of all – cast off the deepest, strongest, warmest 
experiences that burn within us from 9 to 1 and from 4 to 8 and, theoretical ghosts of 
ourselves, ascend into an international fourth dimension.‟74 For the BDF, then, the ability to 
maintain international contacts suggested a lack of rootedness and an ability to intellectualize 
that denied real, that is patriotic, feeling. In October 1915, Bäumer accused the pacifists of 
seeking to avoid sharing Germany‟s destiny, of wanting to breathe „rather than the bitter air of 
our German fate [...] the soft air of a shallow fraternization‟.75 
The claim to true depth of feeling was an important element in the discourse of the BDF even 
before the Hague congress emerged. Writing in 1914, Helene Lange differentiated between 
women‟s general peaceableness and „peace at any price‟: „if the question is war or the 
stalemate of German development, death or the suffocation of German life, then the answer of 
German women is without question: war and death.‟76 Even before the war, Lange had 
expressed her discomfort with the „superficiality‟ and the „empty phrases‟ of international 
meetings, stating robustly in 1900 that „[t]rees need their own soil to take root in: only 
parasites can eke out their short-lived existence on alien organisms‟.77 For veteran campaigner 
Lily Braun, for whom the war meant the restoration of national strength and a strict gender 
hierarchy, too, the pacifists were unpatriotic sentimentalists, ready to accept a cringing peace 
at any price because of „their sentimental pacifism, their foolish dream of the sisterhood of all 
people of the female sex‟.78 
For the pacifist women, however, the discourse of love between the international members 
was far from sentimental folly, but played a significant psychological role during the war 
years. Women pacifists were doubly isolated in their own community – by attitudes to nation 
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that saw pacifism and internationalism as unpatriotic, and by rejection by other women‟s 
groups – so the sense of belonging and shared values available through their international ties 
were especially important. For Heymann, the Hague Congress was „a rest after months of 
anguish, a rest among those who felt the same‟,79 and the Zurich Congress of 1919 „a 
delightful oasis amidst a vast desert‟, a respite among like-minded women from the hostility 
and isolation of everyday life.
80
 Throughout the war, French, German, and English women 
exchanged emotionally charged greetings,
81
 for example in December 1915 French women 
wrote to German women: „We know that the majority among you think as we do and that is 
why we want to say to you that we are sisters and that we love you.‟ German women replied: 
„We think as you do! We feel as you do! We suffer like you with our hands tied and must, like 
you, remain silent!‟82 As well as providing the women with vital emotional support, the 
deliberate stressing of ties of love maintained a sense of the shared humanity of the enemy, 
and women were thus able to maintain channels of communication not open to men both 
during and in the aftermath of the conflict. The warm messages and gestures of mutual 
support and understanding that reached these isolated women or were displayed during rare 
meetings served to create a network of personal friendships and trust amounting to a „fictive 
kinship‟,83 a dream of sisterhood that their opponents dismissed as „foolish‟ but which 
sustained them in their vision of building a lasting peace in times of war.  
The pacifists felt deeply hurt by the lack of recognition for their efforts at bringing peace, 
expressing particular bitterness that the BDF had organized a reception in Berlin in May 1915 
for Congress President Jane Addams and Congress organizer Aletta Jacobs, while „the 
German participants […] were boycotted and declared beyond the pale by the very same 
women‟.84 While many of the pacifists had themselves been members of the BDF up until 
1915, the controversy over the Hague Congress caused them to break their last ties with the 
organization.
85
 The consequences of the rift continued into the post-war period, with 
Heymann and Augspurg taking every opportunity to scoff at and undermine the BDF‟s 
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attempts to bring women‟s influence to bear in the troubled waters of the Weimar Republic. 
Even in 1927, Heymann described the BDF as „pathetic remnants of the women‟s movement‟ 
who were „dragging out their fossilized existence‟.86 The rift never healed, and the pacifists‟ 
continued attacks on the BDF demonstrated little or none of the love, inclusion and mutual 
understanding that supposedly formed the basis of the universal female principle. In fact, the 
German women‟s movement emerged from the war more divided than it had ever been, and 
throughout the Weimar Republic, the BDF was squeezed between nationalist women on the 
one hand, who despised them for what they saw as their weak, conciliatory interaction with 
former enemies, and left-wing radicals on the other who condemned them for what they saw 
as their unquestioning, jingoistic response to the war.
87 
In this climate, and with continued 
negative press coverage of female suffrage, it is not surprising that the women‟s movement 
failed to make full use of the enfranchisement of all German women over the age of 20 that 
came into effect in 1918.
88
 
 
Post-War Congress, Zurich 1919 
 
In May 1919, at the same time as women were excluded from the actual peace 
negotiations in Paris, the pacifist women met again in Zurich to formulate their own 
vision for a sustainable peace and to offer a model for the peaceful and productive 
cooperation of nations.
89
 However, even though the delegates were drawn only from 
among those women who had shown support for pacifist ideas during the war, the 
harmonious face they presented to the world hid tensions that threatened the unity of the 
congress.
90
 For example, most of the Belgian women refused to attend the congress at all, 
stating that it was pro-German, and the belief that it was a „Verliererforum‟ („a forum for 
losers‟) was widespread.91 There were also tensions over the extent to which German 
women could be held responsible for German war crimes or blamed for their apparent 
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failure to speak out against the occupation of Belgium and France.
92
 Hidden, too, was the 
French women‟s organizations‟ refusal to intervene on behalf of the women and children 
affected by the starvation blockade that continued until the signing of the peace treaty, 
the physical effects of which were all too visible in the dramatic weight loss and fatigue 
of the German and Austrian delegates.
93
 We have seen that much of the criticism leveled 
at Gertrud Bäumer was due to her intolerance of dissenting views within the ranks of the 
BDF and her „ruthless exclusion of dissidents‟,94 but it is evident that even the sustaining 
community of WILPF had to be artificially constructed by the exclusion of or refusal to 
acknowledge dissenting voices. 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the war years, it was in the interests of both the leadership of the BDF and the 
pacifist organizers and supporters of the Hague Congress to distance themselves from the 
ideas and attitudes of the other, and both showed themselves to be equally intolerant of 
dissent and equally harsh in their judgement of those with different views. For the pacifist 
women, the existence of a majority of women who supported the war undermined their 
view of the innate pacifism of women, on which their own claims to full female 
citizenship rested. For the women of the BDF, association with suffrage, 
internationalism, and of course pacifism itself, threatened to undermine their own 
unstated war aims, tacitly geared towards demonstrating a fitness for involvement in the 
life of the state and full acceptance in the national community. The BDF leadership‟s 
high-handed stifling of open debate over the 1915 Congress was a bid to present a 
harmonious public front that precluded any expression of support within the organization 
for these unpopular ideas. However, their public display of animosity surrounding the 
Hague Congress and their apparent rejection of previously-professed ideals did much to 
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discredit the women of the BDF at home and abroad, compromised their ability to re-
enter the community of the international women‟s movement after the war and 
undermined their attempts to maintain focus and unity within the German women‟s 
movement during the difficult post-war period. Post-war society in Germany was 
economically, politically, and culturally unstable, violent and traumatized by the defeat 
and the terms of the peace, and the BDF saw its primary post-war mission as overcoming 
these deeply damaging inner divisions.
95
 In January 1919, Bäumer wrote that „there is 
nothing more valuable than the creation of an inner unity of our people […] no national 
demand is more important than this‟.96 In May 1919, she stressed community as the 
highest priority of public life, setting spiritual, inner values against the violence and 
materialism of the times and claiming a central role for women in this endeavour.
97
 It is 
clear that the women of the BDF felt that the post-war inability to transcend personal 
interests and ambition, prejudices and political infighting represented the greatest threat 
to Germany‟s recovery, so it is ironic that they were hampered in one of their key aims by 
divisions within their own movement.
98
  
We have seen that the public discourse as reflected in and fostered by the German press 
was hostile to and highly suspicious of feminist, specifically pacifist, activities and aims, 
and that this was a major factor in compelling the BDF to distance itself so irrevocably 
and so publicly from the aims of the Hague women. We have seen that there were very 
real differences between the two groups‟ responses to war and their relationship to the 
nation state, but there is no doubt that the public controversy over the Hague Congress 
not only exposed but also deepened these divisions, forcing an irreconcilable rift with far-
reaching consequences for the German women‟s movement. 
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